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Editor’s Introduction
On March 29, 1994, the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis hosted a symposium on the implica-
tions of rapid mutual fund growth for monetary
policy. From 1990-93, household holdings of
shares in bond and equity mutual funds increased
at a record pace. During the same period, the
Federal Reserve’s primary monetary aggregate,
M2, grew much more slowly than suggested by
its historical relationships to economic activity
and opportunity costs. Does the confluence of
these events suggest that M2 has become less
useful as an indicator of the stance ofmonetary
policy? Should it be replaced with a new aggre-
gate that includes these mutual funds?
Financial innovation and advances in
technology change the structure of financial
markets, alter the indicatorproperties of monetary
aggregates, and give rise to pressures for their
redefinition. When Regulation Qcapped deposit
offering rates during the 1970s, for example, many
households learned that money market mutual
funds provided an attractive alternative to holding
bank and thrift deposits. As a result, money
market funds were included in M2 when it was
redefined in 1980. During the 1980s, households
became increasingly familiar with financial
institutions other than banks and tbrifts. Mortgage
loans were increasingly originated by mortgage
brokers, auto loans extended by finance compa-
nies, and retirement funds held in self-managed
IRA and Keogh accounts. At the same time, the
mutual fund industry benefited from technical
progress that reduced the cost of servicing large
customer lists and managing portfolios of mar-
ketable securities.
Thus, participants on both sides of the financial
markets seemed poised to react swiftly during
the 1990s to the combination of a sharp decrease
in the overall level of market interest rates and a
record widening ofmaturity-related yield spreads.
Available survey and anecdotal evidence, as well
as negative statistical correlations in the aggregate
data, suggest that households shifted savings
away from traditional depository institutions
toward bond and equity mutual funds, With
offering rates on deposits decreasing, prospective
returns on bond and equity funds often appeared
to be three- or four-fold greater.
The subsequent slow growth of M2 during a
period when many analysts perceived monetary
policy as becoming increasingly expansionary
led to doubts about its usefulness as a policy
indicator. The monetary aggregates were offi-
cially dc-emphasized as policy guides in Federal
Reserve Board Chairman Greenspan’s July 1993
Humphrey-Hawkins Act testimony before
Congress. At about the same time, a group of
economists at the Board of Governors completed
two studies evaluating whether M2 might usefully
be replaced by a redefined aggregatethat included
bond and equity mutual fund shares. l’hese
studies, and the five commentaries that appear
here, were presented atthe St. Louis symposium.
Written by economists closely involved in policy
analysis, the studies provide a unique perspective
on the range ofissues that arise whenever it is
suggested that a monetary aggregate be redefined.
Before a monetary aggregate may be used, it
mustbe measured. In the first article, Sean Collins
and Cheryl Edwards discuss the measurement of
a monetary aggregate M2+ that includes both M2
and shares in bond and equity mutual funds.
They first describe how interest in redefining
an aggregate arises when its growth differs from
that suggested by its historical behavior, Although
necessary, such deviant behavior may not be
sufficient unless there also has been significant
innovation or technical progress in financial
markets since the previous redefinition of the
aggregates. The latter imparts an a priori reason-
ableness to suspicions that the array of money
substitutes available to households and firms
has expanded, or that the transaction costs of
substituting among various alternatives has
decreased.
The current M2 monetaryaggregate is designed
to measure household and firm holdings of liquid
assets that are either available for spending now
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or will become so in the near future. Retaining
this focus in a new monetary aggregate that
includes bond and equity mutual funds requires
separating institutional holdings ofmutual fund
shares from those held by firms and households,
as Collins and Edwards discuss in the latter half
oftheir article. Further, data on several items
that are not included in the new aggregate, such
as the M2-type assets owned by the bond and
equity funds and the amount of mutual fund
shares held by households as illiquid retirement
balances, are also required. These amounts are
subtracted from the new aggregate.
Collins and Edwards discuss several unique
problems that arise while building M2÷ that
have no direct parallel in the current monetary
aggregates. One is the inclusion of assets
denominated in foreign currencies. All compo-
nents of the current officialmonetary aggregates
(Ml, M2, MS and L) are denominated in U.S.
dollars. Mutual funds that invest in foreign
currency-denominated assets, however, have
been among the most rapidly growing type of
funds in recent years. Second, current M2
includes only assets that are capital-certain or,
in other words, only assets whose value does
not vary with the level ofmarket interest rates.
Capital gains and losses are a significant factor
in changes in the value ofbond and equity
funds, and present a thorny problem for both
the construction and interpretation of the
M2+ aggregate.
In the policy arena, monetary aggregates
may be valuable as either targets or indicators,
with requirements for the former generally
more stringent than forthe latter. In both cases,
the aggregate must have a reliable empirical
relationship tofuture economic activity. In
addition, to be useful as a policy target, the
demand for the aggregate must be a stable func-
tion ofa relatively small number of variables
and the Federal Reserve must be able to control
the aggregate’s growth. In the second article,
Athanasios Orphanides, Brian Reid and David
Small judge the M2+ monetary aggregate
relative to each of these criteria.
Modeling the demand for a monetary aggre-
gate requires identifying its close substitutes
and, in turn, the opportunity cost of holding the
components of the aggregate rather than alterna-
tive assets. The inclusion of capital-uncertain
assets in M2+ complicates calculation of its own
rate ofreturn and identification of an appropriate
opportunity cost, The authors conclude that the
nonbank public’s holdings of bond and equity
fund shares seem to respond toboth the spread
between the return on the mutual fund and the
Treasury bill yield, and the change during the
previous period in the overall level of market
rates or equity prices.
In the latter part of their article, Orphanides.
Reid and Small examine the stability ofthe
demand for M2+ and its value as a leading indi-
cator for nominal GDP. Working within the linear
error-correction framework developed by Board
staffin previous money demand studies, they find
a reasonably good overall fitto the data. Yet, the
estimated semi-elasticities of M2+ demand with
respect to market yields and various measures of
its opportunity cost appear highly sensitive to the
form in which these variables enterthe regression.
Perhaps more disappointing, however, is their
conclusion that M2+ has not been a generally
better indicator than M2 of movements in
nominal GDP growth during the lOgOs,
In their commentary, William Barnett and
Ge Zhou interpret the definition of M2+ as a
dynamic index number problem. When the
financial assets in an economy can be partitioned
into two non-overlapping groups—those that
provide monetary (transaction) services and those
that do not—the economy’s money stock is
correctly measured by summing the quantities
of the assets in the former group. It is the essence
of financial innovation, however, to blur the
distinction between these groups and allow assets
in the latter category to providemonetary as well
as non-monetary services. The authors show,
however, that sequentially redefining a broad
monetary aggregate may cause the aggregate to
move further away from, rather than closer to,
the economy’s true money stock, They laud the
authors of the symposium’s two major papers
for grappling with the difficult issue of including
capital-uncertain assets in a monetary aggregate.
Jacob Dreyer doubts, however, that a new
M2+ monetary aggregate would be useful to
policymakers. The necessity of estimating
expected holding period yields likely precludes
obtaining useful estimates of a demand equation
for the aggregate. He also argues that turnover
rates suggest that bond and equity mutual funds
lack the necessary degree of “moneyness” for
them to reasonably be included in a monetary
aggregate along with the current components of
M2. Although acknowledging that thetransaction
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have fallen sharply, he regards this change as
creating only the illusion, rather than the
substance, of moneyness.
In his commentary, John Duca attributes the
slower-than-anticipated growth of M2 during the
l990s to a combination of changes in banking
regulation and the pattern of market interest rates,
Duca notes that significant shifts in financial
intermediation also occurred in the lO7Os and
l980s when government regulation interacted
with large movements in market interest rates.
Nevertheless, he concludes that the unprece-
dented steep slope of the yield curve during a
period when offering rates on bank and thrift
deposits fell to their lowest levels in decades
likely was the primary motivation for households
to substitute holdings of bond and equity funds
for M2-type assets during the l990s. This
substitution does not, by itself, call for a
redefinition ofM2, however.
Josh Feinman suggests that the dramatic
shrinkage of the federal subsidy to the depository
sector since 1990 seems to have played the larger
role in depressing M2 growth. He cites higher
deposit insurance premiums, new capital stan-
dards and stricter supervision as examples.
These changes reduced the incentive for deposi-
tories to pursue their traditional lending and
deposit-taking activities, resulting in an increasing
proportion ofintermediation being conducted
through market instruments such as corporate
equity and commercial paper, popular investments
ofbond and equity mutual funds. He doubts that
M2+ could ever be useful as a policy target or
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indicator. In his view, the inverse correlation
between movements in market interest rates and
the value of the capital-uncertain assets included
in M2+ likely precludes formulating any policy
feedback rules based on M2+.
George Pennacchi suggests that households’
increased holdings of mutual fund shares might
be interpreted as a reaction to the narrower rate
spreads between liquid and time deposits at banks
during the l99Os. Reductions in transaction costs
and improvements in computer technology have
increased the liquidity ofbond and equity mutual
funds, making them more competitive with liquid
deposits in such an environment. He suggests
that the lower turnover rates ofbond and equity
fund shares should not be taken as evidence that
households have not responded to, and do not
value, the increased liquidity of the funds.
Moreover, although the funds are subject to
liquidity (interest rate) risk, economic theory
suggests that the expected holding period yields
of these mutual funds should not differ system-
atically, on balance, from other market returns.
Finally, I want to recognize the economic analysts
in the Research Department ofthe Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis who provided invaluable help
in reviewing references and data for the sympo-
sium papers: Heidi L. Beyer, Heather Deaton,
Kelly M. Morris and Richard D. Taylor.
Richard G. Anderson
St. Louis, Missouri
November 1, 1994
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